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Abstract.  Micro-econometric  intra-cohort  profitability  analyses  of  pay-as-you-go  (PAYG) 
pension contributions are rare. We use representative employment histories of a birth cohort 
of German PAYG pension insurants retiring in year 2005 to econometrically examine the 
determinants of the profitability of such contributions using nominal internal rates of return 
(IRR)  as  profitability  measure.  When  future  nominal  pension  entitlements  are  frozen  at 
today’s level, average IRR is slightly above three percent. At the same time, IRR differs 
substantially  across  beneficiaries.  IRR  is  increasing  in  beneficiaries’  remaining  life 
expectancies at retirement and in the length of non-contribution periods resulting, for example, 
from child care or care for an ill partner. Due to survivor pensions, married insurants benefit 
from  higher  IRR  as  compared  to  the  non-married.  Interestingly,  IRR  is  decreasing  in 
insurants’ earnings  capacity, indicating that the system entails an intra-cohort progressive 
element. 
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1 Introduction 
As shown by Samuelson (1958), in a two-age groups overlapping generations model (OLG) 
with an infinite time horizon, an exogenous production sector and a constant contribution rate, 
the steady-state rate of return on contributions in a pay-as-you-go (PAYG) pension system is 
equal  to  the  rate  of  growth  in  the  labor  force  and  in  productivity.  Hence,  in  countries 
experiencing population ageing, low fertility and low productivity growth, pre-funded pension 
systems with privately defined contribution plans may appear a superior alternative. Indeed, 
the two most propagated arguments in favor of privately defined contribution plans are that 
such plans raise national savings and thus stimulate growth, and that returns on contributions 
are higher than in PAYG systems (e.g., Palacios and Whitehouse, 1998).
1 
Models  that  quantitatively  investigate  rates  of  return  on  pension  contributions  almost 
exclusively focus on the inter-generational dimension. Recent literatures include Settergren 
and Mikula (2005) and Knell (2010). Only a few studies address the intra-cohort dimension 
(i.e., Cubeddu, 2000, Auerbach and Kotlikoff, 1987, Imrohoroglu et al., 1995, and Fullerton 
and Rogers, 1993). This is surprising as the intra-cohort dimension is of key relevance for 
policymakers: PAYG pension schemes approach maturity  worldwide and the intra-cohort 
distribution of rates of return can be seen as an indicator of life-time redistribution within the 
pension system. Particularly, the intra-cohort dimension reveals how well, in monetary terms, 
an insurant is treated relative to other insurants in her cohort, and how well-off the birth 
cohort as a whole is (e.g., Liebman, 2001, pp. 5-6). 
In many countries neither experts nor the public know how intra-cohort distributions of rates 
of return on pension contributions look like, largely because the necessary micro data, i.e. 
insurances’ biographies  together with their pension entitlements, is not available.  Instead, 
rates  of  return  on  pension  contributions  are  typically  computed  for  some  types  of 
“representative” insurants with stylized biographies. Yet, such representative beneficiaries are 
rarely an efficient simplification, and the exception rather than the rule: Even within the same 
birth cohort, labor-market shocks, human capital investments, marriage and fertility decisions, 
and other factors cause substantial heterogeneity in individuals’ employment biographies. All 
these factors affect individual pension contributions and entitlements, and this may map in 
                                                 
1 Of course, the rate of return is only one evaluation criterion. Potentially favorable effects of PAYG systems 
include the elimination of adverse selection (Townley and Boadway, 1988; Feldstein, 1990) and the avoidance of 
free riding by parents at the expense of their altruistic children (Lindbeck and Weibull, 1988). They can also 
serve as a device for intergenerational risk sharing (e.g., Smith, 1982, and Gordon and Varian, 1988), and as an 
insurance  against  not  having  children  (Sinn,  2004).  Moreover,  they  may  act  as  an  enforcement  device  for 
ungrateful children (Sinn, 2004).   3 
differences  in  rates  of  return  across  insurants.
2  Furthermore,  computations  based  on 
representative beneficiary types do not shed light on the intra-cohort redistributive channels 
inherent  in  pension  systems,  coming  from  the  fact  that  pension  entitlements  depend  on 
various factors other than earnings. For example, in the German system as in many others, 
pension entitlements of married insurants can be transferred to the partner after the insurant’s 
death; insurants with children benefit from regulations that compensate for income losses 
during periods of child rising. 
For such and other reasons, Bosworth et al. (1999) argue that stylized hypothetical earnings 
biographies assuming steady earnings throughout earnings careers are misleading, and argue 
that researchers should consider real-life earnings patterns that can be seen in micro data. The 
present work seeks to contribute in this direction by providing the intra-cohort distribution of 
internal  rates  of  return  (IRR)  on  pension  contributions  in  Germany’s  PAYG  system,  the 
blueprint of Bismarck-type pension systems worldwide. 
In our analysis, we focus on old-age pensioners with West German employment biographies 
retiring in year 2005. These insurants realized an average expected nominal IRR of about 3.3 
percent. At the same time, IRR substantially differs across different beneficiary groups. In 
particular,  IRR  is  significantly  influenced  by  the  beneficiaries’  gender:  it  is  about  one 
percentage point higher for female compared with male beneficiaries. The IRR gender divide 
results from the fact that the German PAYG system credits periods of child rising or care for 
ill/handicapped  partners  and  that  female  insurants  undertake  these  activities  more  often. 
Another  important  finding  is  that  the  IRR  is  decreasing  in  insurants’  lifetime  earnings, 
suggesting that the German system entails an intra-cohort lifetime progressive element. 
The IRR distribution is derived from authentic representative social security records from a 
recently  released  database,  the  “Completed  Insurant  Lives”
3 (CIB)  provided  to  us  by  the 
German Pension Insurance. For a representative sample of pension insurants retiring in year 
2005,  the  CIB  contains  monthly-level  information  on  insurants’  employment  biographies. 
Particularly,  the  database  documents,  for  each  insurant,  the  entire  stream  of  pension 
contributions  before  retirement  together  with  actual  annual  pension  entitlements  at  the 
moment of retirement. Unfortunately, the CIB does not include insurants who did not survive 
until  retirement.  Accordingly,  our  IRR  estimates  are  conditional  upon  survival.  Due  to  a 
positive risk of pre-retirement death, unconditional IRR estimates should be lower. In sum, 
                                                 
2 Also the “timing” of earnings through the employment biography can affect internal rates of return. 
3 The original German title of the database is “Vollendete Versichertenleben”.   4 
our  approach  takes  a  forward-looking  perspective  on  retirement  and  a  backward-looking 
perspective on employment.
4  
Empirical studies on the intra-cohort IRR distribution, such as ours, are scarce due to the lack 
of adequate data. Only a handful of studies exist, including Burkhauser and Warlick (1981), 
Hurd and Shoven (1985), Duggan et al. (1993), Gustman and Steinmeier (1999), and Liebman 
(2001). To the best of our knowledge, previous studies for Germany exclusively focused on 
stylized biographies (e.g., Schnabel and Ottnad, 2008, Ohsmann and Stolz, 2004, or Schnabel, 
1998).  
The remainder of the article is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the database and its 
preparation. Section 3 contains the technical framework. The sample breakdown is presented 
in  Section  4,  and  Section  5  provides  our  empirical  results.  Section  6  deals  with  the 
implications of our results, and Section 7 concludes. 
 
2 Database and data preparation 
2.1 Completed Insurant Lives 2005 
The scientific use file “Completed Insurant Lives” (CIB) from year 2005 is an excerpt of all 
German  social  insurance  accounts.  It  stores  representative  administrative  employment 
biographies of 37,716 pension beneficiaries born between year 1940 and 1975 entitled to 
public pension benefits (old age and reduced-earnings capacity pensions) from year 2005 and 
on.  The  database  is  split  into  two  parts.  The  first  part  contains  several  time-invariant 
variables,  e.g.,  the  beneficiary’s  gender,  nationality,  date  of  birth,  or  type  of  pension 
entitlement. The second part documents the employment histories. For each beneficiary, it 
reports monthly data on pension contributions, employment status, child raising activity, etc. 
Up to 624 elements of monthly information (equivalent to 52 insurance years) are stored in a 
624 716 , 37 × matrix  for  every  reported  variable.  No  other  German  database  provides 
longitudinal biographical information for a longer time horizon. 
We have discarded several biographies from the database for reasons listed below: 
(1)  Sometimes biographical information is fragmented and incomplete. This can happen 
if  the  pension  entitlement  of  a  beneficiary  has  been  computed  manually  by  an 
employee of the German pension insurance (see German Pension Insurance, 2007, p. 
15, for details). This affects 2,222 cases which have been discarded from the database. 
                                                 
4 We would like to thank two anonymous referees for their most helpful comments concerning the impact of the 
sample restrictions on our (conditional) IRR estimates.   5 
(2)  As our focus is on old-age pensioners (according to Social Security Code (SSC), 
Book VI §§35, 36, 37, 237, 237a), we have excluded all beneficiaries receiving a 
pension for a limited duration only, e.g. due to a serious illness.
5 Including such cases 
would have urged us to make (arbitrary) assumptions about the duration of illness and 
the future ability/capacity to work. For this reason 7,133 cases have been discarded. 
(3)  Altogether, 5,991 beneficiaries have made contributions to the pension system of the 
Former  German  Democratic  Republic.
6  These  are  discarded  as  a  meaningful 
conversion of contributions made in Marks to pension entitlements in Euro seems 
impossible to us. 
(4)  Some  beneficiaries  are  entitled  to  an  old-age  pension  without  ever  having  made 
sizable own contributions from earned income subject to mandatory insurance. Such a 
beneficiary’s IRR can be quite high. To avoid outlier-driven bias, we have excluded 
the one percent of beneficiaries with the highest IRR. For symmetry reasons, we have 
also excluded the one percent with the lowest IRR. Altogether, this results in dropping 
562 ( 2 281 = ⋅ ) cases. 
By construction, the resulting working sample underlying all further calculations is not 
“representative” in the sense of the original CIB database. The CIB represents all the 
insurants  born  between  1940  and  1975  entitled  to  an  old  age  or  a  reduced-earnings 
capacity  pension  from  year  2005  onwards.  Instead,  our  working  sample  of  21,509 
insurants  contains  West  German  old-age  pensioners  born  between  1940  and  1945. 
Accordingly, our analysis sheds light on a specific, yet prominent sub-population of the 
original CIB database: old-age pensioners with West German employment biographies. 
 
2.2 Survival probabilities 
To assess the expected value of pension entitlements, insurants’ survival probabilities are 
required. Survival probabilities are derived from official gender- and age-specific mortality 
statistics for West Germany (see German Federal Statistical Office, 2007, for details). For 
persons of age 60 to 65 in year 2005, Figure 1 depicts survival probabilities up to an age of 
100 years. Altogether, six graphs are provided, one for each age in year 2005 (60 to 65 years). 
Within each graph, survival probabilities are further distinguished by gender. For example, 
the graph in the bottom left corner of Figure 1 indicates that in year 2005 a 64 year old 
woman’s (man’s) probability to survive another 20 years is about 60 (40) percent. 
                                                 
5 A similar approach is also adopted in Liebman (2001). 
6 The number includes five cases for which the region of residence is not provided.   6 
In case of an insurant’s death, the surviving partner can receive a survivor pension which 
constitutes a further return component on the insurant’s contributions. To derive the expected 
value of survivor pensions, we have also computed the probability that an insurant deceases in 
a specific year after retirement while the partner is still alive (and hence is credited a survivor 
pension).  Resulting  joint  probabilities  are  summarized  in  Figure  2.  Again,  graphs  are 
decomposed by retirement age and gender. The joint probabilities rely on the assumption that 
the  partner  of  a  male  (female)  insurant  is  three  years  younger  (older).  Higher  survival 
probabilities  of  females  together  with  the  age  difference  between  the  partners  lead  to  a 
substantial gap in the joint probabilities for female and male insurants.
7 
Mortality tables provided by the German Federal Statistical Office do not differentiate with 
respect to income. However, several studies suggest that people with higher incomes tend to 
live longer (e.g., Rogot et al., 1992, and Pappas et al., 1993). This affects the IRR distribution: 
our approach tends to underestimate IRR of insurants with high income. We will come back 
to  this  issue  in  Section  5.2.  Official  mortality  statistics  also  do  not  reveal  the  inter-
dependencies in the remaining lifetimes of spouses. According to Luciano et al. (2008), when 
one of the spouses dies, the partner’s probability of dying rises. Then our IRR estimates for 
married insurants are too high as expected returns from widow(er) pensions are overvalued. 
Finally, the possibility of future improvements in life expectancy is not taken into account, 
potentially leading to downward-biased IRR estimates. 
 
3 Definitions, legal and technical framework 
3.1 IRR – unique, nominal, and gross 
IRR measures the profitability of an investment. It is the interest rate, i, for which the net 
present value of an investment is zero. As our perspective is forward-looking on retirement, 
returns are weighted by survival probabilities.
8 As we take a backward-looking perspective on 
employment, the flow of investment, i.e. the pension contributions, enter the computations in 
non-weighted form. Let t denote a period,  0 t B ≥  the pension contribution in t, and  [ ] t E R  
the expected value of the pension  0 t R ≥ , then the expected IRR at the moment of retirement 
(year 2005) ensures that 
                                                 
7 See German Federal Statistical Office (2007) for information on life expectancies and age differences between 
male and female spouses. 
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Generally,  if  the  sign  of  cash  flows  repeatedly  changes  over  time,  multiple  IRR  can  be 
obtained, making it difficult to decide which IRR to use. This complication does not apply in 
our  case  as  the  sign  changes  only  once,  namely  from  exclusively  negative  during  the 
contribution phase to positive in the retirement phase. Hence, individual IRR functions are 
continuous and unique, potentially ranging from plus infinity to minus infinity. 
In principle, IRR can be obtained from cash flows denominated in real or nominal terms. In 
the first case, contributions and pension entitlements are expressed in prices as of the time of 
occurrence of the flow. In the second case, they are expressed in prices as of the day of the 
evaluation.  Using  data  on  past  consumer  prices,  it  is  possible  to  convert  previous 
contributions in real terms. Expressing future returns in real terms, however, would require 
price forecasts for the next decades. As forecast errors can be huge, we have expressed all 
flows in nominal terms. Measuring IRR in nominal terms has a second merit as it allows 
comparisons with nominal capital market interest rates. 
The German pension system is stabilized via substantial tax-financed state subsidies. Non-
insurance-related benefits such as transfers to the new federal states, to families, immigrants 
and minimum pensions, which are not entirely covered by own contributions, are the rationale 
for these subsidies. The rise in VAT rates in April 1998 was justified by a rising deficit in the 
public pension system and the political will not to further increase contribution rates. Since 
year 1990, the share of total PAYG expenses that was covered by state subsidies rose from 
18.7 to 27.8 percent (see Figure 3 for details). Our IRR estimates do not reflect that such 
subsidies  are  financed  by  taxes,  also  imposed  on  the  beneficiaries.  Moreover,  tax-
subsidization  may  have  additional  distributional  effects.  Germany’s  income-tax  tariff,  for 
example, is progressive. Taking such an effect into account would reduce the IRR of “rich” 
relative to the “poor.” 
Finally, our IRR estimates are gross. In the German PAYG system, pension contributions are 
equally  financed  by  the  beneficiary  and  her  employer.
  Eventually,  both  reduce  the 
beneficiary’s  net  earnings  so  that  we  interpret  the  sum  of  both  as  the  beneficiary’s 
investment.
9 To be consistent, we consider gross pension entitlements before tax deductions, 
health care or care insurance contributions when calculating the IRR. 
 
                                                 
9 For empirical evidence that the incidence of payroll taxation is fully on wages see, for example, Gruber (1997).   8 
3.2 Deriving IRR from the database 
This  subsection  first  sketches  the  legal  framework  determining  pension  contributions  and 
entitlements. Then we show how the necessary information can be derived from CIB and 
complementary external databases and summarize our working assumptions. 
Book six of the Social Security Code contains the legal framework of Germany’s statutory 
pay-as-you-go  pension  system.  A  central  characteristic  of  the  system  is  a  close  relation 
between the sum of earnings liable to compulsory insurance from so-called “contribution 
periods” and monthly pension entitlement after retirement. However, pension entitlements can 
also  be  gained  during  so-called  “non-contribution  periods”.  For  example,  when  a  mother 
withdraws  from  the  labor  market  after  the  birth  of  a  child,  pension  contributions  (and 
corresponding  entitlements)  are  credited  for  a  limited  period  although  she  did  not  make 
pension contributions from own earnings in the same period. Non-contribution periods can be 
credited for the following reasons: (i) sickness, rehabilitation, studies or higher education, and 
others  (so-called  “Anrechnungszeiten”);  (ii)  military  service  or  detention  due  to  political 
reasons  (so-called  “Ersatzzeiten”);  (iii)  child-raising  or  care  of  dependants 
(“Berücksichtigungszeiten”). 
The sum of all the credited pension contributions of a beneficiary  j  in period t ,  , j t b , (in 
Euro) equals 
( ) , , 2 j t t t j t b E CR RP = ⋅ ⋅ . 
In  equation  (2),  t E  is  the  national  average  of  earnings  in t  (expressed  in  Euro),  t CR  the 
contribution rate in t, and  , j t RP  denotes the remuneration points accumulated by  j  in t.  t E  
and  t CR  are identical for all beneficiaries and can be taken from official statistics.  , j t RP  is 
beneficiary-specific  and  is  stored  in  CIB’s  variable  part.  Remuneration  points  from  own 
employment are directly linked with annual earnings subject to compulsory insurance. If  j ’s 
earnings in period t coincide with average earnings of all employed workers in the same year 
(50  percent  of  the  national  average),  , 1.0 j t RP =  ( , 0.5 j t RP = ).  Accumulated  remuneration 
points during aforementioned non-contribution period do not reflect an investment. For this 
reason, they are not included when a beneficiary’s investment is computed. However, they are 
considered when the pension entitlement is defined.  
It  is  possible  to  distinguish  remuneration  points  from  own  contributions  and  from  non-
contribution periods through combining, month per month, the information contained in the   9 
variables  624 1,...,mEGPT mEGPT ,  624 1,...,gmEGPT gmEGPT ,  624 1,...,SES SES ,  and 
1 624 ,..., JKUM JKUM . The variable  m mEGPT  provides the remuneration points from principal 
employment in month m . The variable  m gmEGPT  is an aggregate including remuneration 
points  from  principal  and  non-principal  employment  as  well  as  from  non-contribution 
periods. The variable  m SES  describes the insurant’s social status, e.g. whether the insurant is 
employed, unemployed, is raising a child or caring for an ill partner. The dummy variable 
m JKUM  indicates whether the insurant has more than one employment contract subject to 
mandatory insurance. 
In  our  calculations,  monthly  pension  contributions  are  defined  by  m mEGPT  whenever 
m JKUM  does  not  indicate  more  than  one  employment  contract  subject  to  mandatory 
insurance. Otherwise, we use  m gmEGPT . Our approach may lead to some error in the value 
of the derived investment if beneficiaries have two or more employment contracts and, in the 
same  month,  are  credited  remuneration  points  for  a  non-contribution  period.  Such  cases 
should be a rare exception. 
When computing actual insurants’ investments, only contributions from own earnings should 
matter. Accordingly, let  a m =  denote the first and  11 + = a m  the last month of a year t, then 
remuneration points from own contributions are determined via 
( )
11 11
, , , , , 3 1 2
a a
own
t j j m j m j m j m
m a m a
RP mEGPT E gmEGPT E
+ +
= =
= ⋅ + ⋅ ∑ ∑ . 
In  equation  (3),  , 1j m E  and  , 2 j m E  denote  dummy  variables.  , 1j m E  ( , 2 j m E )  equals  one  if 
beneficiary  j  earns  exactly  one  income  (more  than  one  income)  subject  to  compulsory 
insurance  in  month  m .  Otherwise,  the  respective  dummy  is  zero.
10 Then,  j ’s  annual 
contributions from own earnings in t equal  , ,
own
j t t t j t b E CR RP = ⋅ ⋅ . The sum of contributions 
made by the beneficiary and her employer is  , , 2
own
j t j t B b = ⋅ . 
Pension entitlements are defined by the so-called “pension formula”. According to SSC VI 
§64, the annual pension entitlement of an insurant  j  in year t is 
( ) , 4 12 j t t j j R A E RA = ⋅ ⋅ ⋅ . 
The variable  t A  denotes the aggregate level of current pensions (“Aktueller Rentenwert”), a 
monetary amount that links up the pension entitlement with several macro variables including 
                                                 
10 Further details on the handling of the data and the STATA codes can be provided by the author upon request.   10 
the wage sum, the nation-wide sum of pension contributions, the demographic structure of the 
population, etc. (see SSC VI §68 for details). In year 2005, for example, the current pension 
level in Germany’s Old Federal States was €26.13. The variable  j E  is the number of personal 
remuneration  points  a  beneficiary  has  accrued  over  the  lifetime  (stored  in  the  variable 
psegpt90 in the fix part of the CIB database), i.e. the sum of all remuneration points (from 
own  contributions  and  also  from  non-contribution  periods)  corrected  for  the  so-called 
“Zugangsfaktor”. The latter reduces annual pension entitlements in case of early retirement 
(see SSC VI §77 for details).
11 Finally, the “Rentenartfaktor”,  j RA , differs by the type of 
pension  that  is  defined  in  the  variable  LEAT  in  CIB’s  fix  part.  For  example,  the 
Rentenartfaktor equals 1.0 when an old-age pension according to SSC Book VI, §§ 35, 36, 37, 
237, 237a is granted. It is 0.55 when a “large” widow(er) pension is granted (see SSC VI §77 
for details). Now, the actual pension entitlement of an insurant can be computed. However, an 
assumption is necessary concerning the evolution of pension entitlements for future years. We 
assume a rather conservative scenario where all future pension entitlements (from year 2009 
and on) are frozen at the nominal level of year 2008.
12 
With  the  streams  of  contributions,  pension  entitlements  and  survival  probabilities,  the 
expected nominal IRR for every beneficiary can be computed. When no survivor pension 
must  be  taken  into  account,  IRR  equalizes  the  value  of  annual  contributions  (from  own 
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In equation (5),  ,1954 j B , for example, denotes the annual amount of pension contributions from 
own employment of beneficiary  j (and her employer) in year 1954, and  ,2006 j R  is the pension 
entitlement in year 2006. The term  ( ) , , j t j j P a g  denotes the probability that a person  j  of 
gender  j g  retiring at age  j a  is alive in period t. 
The returns from an insurant’s contributions do not necessarily end after her death, i.e. if a 
surviving partner exists who is credited a widow(er) pension.
13 We interpret survivor pensions 
                                                 
11 Today’s pension entitlements are reduced by 0.3 percent per month of early retirement. 
12 Even if future replacement rates decline, it is quite unlikely that future nominal pension entitlements will fall. 
13 The variable FMSD from the fix part of the VVL database allows a distinction between non-married and 
widowed as well as between married and re-married beneficiaries.   11 
as  a  further  but  risky  return  component  on  beneficiaries’  pension  contributions.
14 The 
expected value of the survivor pension is derived using the joint probabilities from Section 
2.2. Let  , k t W  be the survivor pension being paid to  j ’s partner k , then equation (5) becomes 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
2005 2046 2005 2005-t
j,t j,t , , , ,
1954 2005
5 B (1 i )   R , W R ,Y , 1
t
j j t j j k t j t k j t j j j
t t
a P a g Q a g i
−
= =
    ⋅ + = ⋅ + ⋅ +       ∑ ∑
with  , j t Q  indicating the joint probability that an insurant with characteristics ( ) , j j a g  in year 
t is dead whereas the married partner is still alive. The level of the survivor pension depends 
on j ’s pension entitlement and several socio-economic characteristics of the partner, captured 
by the vector  k Y : the partner’s own pension entitlement, age, health status, etc. Unfortunately, 
CIB  does  not  provide  information  on  the  partner’s  characteristics.  We  assume  that  the 
surviving partner always receives a “large” widow(er) pension and that the corresponding 
income equals the mean pension entitlement of a married beneficiary of the same gender. 
According to SSC VI, any Euro of a survivor’s income exceeding a threshold amount of 26.4 
times the current pension level reduces the survivor pension by € 0.40. As “large” widow(er) 
pensions are granted if the surviving partner has reached the age of 47 and all insurants in the 
working sample are of age 60 or older, using “large” widow(er) pensions in the computations 
should be an appropriate procedure. 
 
4 Sample description 
Table 1 provides the sample composition. The sample is about equally split in male and 
female beneficiaries. About three out of four beneficiaries are married or re-married. The 
average age at retirement is about 63 years with hardly any difference between male and 
female beneficiaries. Accordingly, compared to the official retirement age of 65 years in year 
2005, the average beneficiary retires about two years earlier. Indeed, as can be seen from 
Figure 4, a substantial fraction of the working sample already retires around the age of 60 
years.  
Table 2 illustrates the sample composition by type of old-age pension. Most beneficiaries 
receive  an  old-age  retirement  pension  according  to  SSC  VI  §35,  a  so-called 
“Regelaltersrente”.  Entitlement  to  “Regelaltersrente”  requires  that  a  beneficiary  has 
completed her 65
th life year, and has been insured for a specific time period (the so-called 
“Wartezeit”). Other beneficiaries in the sample receive an unemployment or part time work 
                                                 
14 Orphans’  pensions  (see  SSC  VI  §48)  or  child-raising  pensions  (see  SSC  VI  §47)  cannot  be  modeled 
adequately and are not considered in our calculations.   12 
old-age pension. Such an old-age pension is credited to beneficiaries of age 60 or older in 
case of unemployment or part time employment around retirement (see SSC VI §237 for 
details). For female beneficiaries further regulations may apply (SSC VI §237a). Altogether 
4,241 female beneficiaries are entitled to old-age pensions according to SSC VI §237 and 
§237a. 
Specific regulations also apply to handicapped persons. A handicapped person is granted an 
old-age pension after having completed her 63
rd year of life if she can claim a “Wartezeit” of 
at  least  35  years.
15 Altogether,  2,151  beneficiaries  are  entitled  to  such  a  pension,  the 
predominant fraction of them being male. Finally, old-age pensions for long-term insured 
persons (“Altersrente für langjährig Versicherte”, SSC VI §36) are granted to beneficiaries of 
age 62 to 65 years with a “Wartezeit” of 35 years. With 1,888 out of 2,161 cases, male 
beneficiaries constitute the dominant part of this sub-sample. 
Gender-specific distributions of remuneration points accumulated over their lifetimes can be 
taken  from  Figure  5.  It  is  transparent  that  male  beneficiaries,  on  average,  accrue  more 
remuneration  points  and  hence  are  entitled  to  higher  annual  pensions  than  female 
beneficiaries. As can be taken from Figure 6, most of the difference can be explained by the 
fact that male beneficiaries typically have longer contribution periods compared to female 
beneficiaries. Yet, also the composition of the remuneration points is gender-specific.
 16 As 
outlined above, remuneration points can be gained from own contribution periods but also 
from  non-contribution  periods.  Table  3  gives  the  shares  of  remuneration  points  accrued 
during periods when no own contributions were made. On average, about 15 percent of a 
beneficiary’s remuneration points stem from non-contribution periods, and about 85 percent 
result  from  own  contribution  periods.  The  fraction  of  remuneration  points  from  non-
contribution periods is substantially higher for female beneficiaries (22.226 percent compared 
to 7.489 percent). Particularly, remuneration points for child raising periods and care for an ill 
partner are driving this divide. 
 
5 IRR estimates and the IRR distribution 
Section 5 consists of two parts. Section 5.1 provides descriptive statistics of the IRR and its 
distribution. A regression analysis quantifying the determinants of IRR follows in Section 5.2. 
                                                 
15 Under specific conditions, the pension can already be granted at an age of 60 year. 
16 Remuneration points from contribution-free periods (VVL05 variable: byfhep90); remuneration points from 
periods of reduced contribution (VVL05 variable: bygmep90); additional remuneration points from periods of 
reduced  contributions  (VVL05  variable:  zbygme90);  remuneration  points  for  childcare  (VVL05  variable: 
dvki90); additional remuneration points for childcare and care (zqegki90).   13 
 
5.1 Descriptive statistics 
Table  4  presents  the  IRR  sample  means  and  standard  deviations  for  the  entire  working 
sample, differentiated by gender and also by type of old-age pension. For example, consider 
the entry in row “Standard old-age retirement pension (SSC VI §35)” in column “Female 
insurants”. It indicates that the expected average IRR on pension contributions for female 
beneficiaries receiving a standard old-age retirement pension is 4.753 percent. We would like 
to remind the reader that all  IRR estimates  are conditional upon insurants’ survival until 
retirement and healthy completion of employment history (i.e., not being disabled). Moreover, 
it is assumed future pension entitlements are frozen on 2008 level. 
An immediate observation following from the figures is that female beneficiaries benefit from 
an above-average expected IRR, i.e. 3.884 percent compared with 2.572 percent for male 
beneficiaries. The difference in gender-specific average IRR can be explained by a longer 
payoff  phase  for  females  resulting  from  a  higher  life-expectancy.  Another  reason  is  that 
particularly females benefit from remuneration points credited in non-contribution periods for 
childcare, etc. By type of old-age pension, recipients of a standard old-age retirement pension 
benefit  from  a  particularly  high  IRR.  The  regression  analysis  following  in  Section  5.2 
investigates these and other relationships in more detail. 
Figures 7 and 8 complement the information provided in Table 4 by IRR histograms. In each 
graph,  the  horizontal  axis  gives  IRR,  and  the  vertical  axis  the  relative  frequency  of 
beneficiaries with a respective IRR level. Figure 7 provides the gender-specific information 
for the full sample, and Figure 8 provides IRR histograms by type of old-age pension. Black 
bars always relate to female beneficiaries, grey bars to male beneficiaries.  
Figure 7 suggests that IRR distributions are highly gender-specific. For male beneficiaries, the 
distribution looks lognormal with a peak slightly above two percent and a fatter right than left 
tail. For female beneficiaries, the distribution is about uniformly distributed between 2.0 and 
4.5 percent, and it possesses a fatter right tail. Histograms by pension-type in Figure 8 support 
the impression of systematic gender-specific differences even after controlling for the type of 
pension. Most pronounced, is the difference in SSC VI §35-related pensions. Here the shape 
is uniform for female beneficiaries with a peak at an IRR level of about 4.5 percent. For male 
insurants, the distribution has two peaks, one at an IRR level of about 2.0 percent and another 
around 4.0 percent. The graph for §237a pension-recipients contains only one histogram. The   14 
reason is that only female insurants are credited §237a pensions. The peak of the histogram is 
at an IRR level of around 2.5 percent. 
 
5.2 Regression analysis 
The subsequent regression analysis is performed for two purposes. First, it quantifies how 
insurants’  individual  characteristics  and  PAYG  system  inherent  regulations  affect  IRR. 
Second, it sheds light on whether such regulations have similar effects on the IRR of female 
and male beneficiaries after controlling for individual characteristics. 
The regression model is 
( ) , , 6 . j r j r j p j p j j j
r p
i s RP D Partner Age α β ζ δ φ ϕ ε = + ⋅ + ⋅  + ⋅ + ⋅ + ⋅  + ∑ ∑  
The left-hand variable  j i  is the nominal internal rate of return for beneficiary  j  in percent. 
The  parameter  α  denotes  the  regression  constant.  The  variable  , j r s  gives  the  share  of 
remuneration  points  of  type  r ,  excluding  the  share  of  remuneration  points  from  own 
contributions to avoid multi-collinearity. As remuneration points from own contributions are 
excluded  from  the  regression,  r β  should  be  positive  for  non-contribution  periods  when 
remuneration points are credited as a result of specific regulations, e.g. childcare.
17 To assess 






  = . It reveals 
how much, in relative terms, the total sum of remuneration points from own contributions, 
j RP , deviates from the sample mean, RP. If  0 ζ >  ( 0 ζ < ), IRR is positively (negatively) 
related  with  earnings  capacity  and  the  system  entails  a  lifetime  regressive  (progressive) 
element.  , j p D  is a dummy variable. It takes the value 1 if beneficiary  j  receives an old-age 
pension according to paragraph  p  (other than SSC VI §35 which serves as the reference). 
Hence, parameter  p δ  captures  IRR differences across different types of old-age pensions. 
j Partner  is a dummy indicating the marital status of the insurant. It is set equal to one if the 
insurant is married and zero else. Due to survival pensions, we should expect the respective 
regression coefficient φ  to be positive. The variable  j Age    gives the difference between the 
official retirement age and insurants’ age at retirement, so that ϕ  captures the effect of early 
                                                 
17 See also Sinn (2004), and Cigno et al. (2003) for the resulting incentive effects.   15 
retirement on IRR.
18 Finally,  j ε  denotes the error term. In addition to a regression based on 
the  full  working  sample,  we  also  run  gender-specific  regressions  and  apply 
2 χ  tests  to 
investigate whether the right hand side variables have the same effects for male and female 
insurants. 
The regression results are provided in Table 5. Adjusted coefficients of determination suggest 
that the regression models capture heterogeneity in IRR satisfactorily well. F statistics reject 
the null-hypothesis that all the regression coefficients (excluding the constant) are zero. 
Concerning the composition of remuneration points, remuneration points from childcare and 
care have a particularly positive impact on IRR. The 
2 χ  test statistic indicates that the effect 
is  more  pronounced  for  females  (at  10  percent  significance  level).  Moreover,  such 
remuneration points are typically accumulated by female beneficiaries, contributing to the 
gender divide in IRR observed in Section 5.1. For the full sample, the regression coefficient 
pertaining  to  the  share  of  additional/credited  remuneration  points  for  childcare  has  no 
significant effect. For the male sub-sample, it has a strong and negative effect. However, the 
result  should  not  be  overrated:  only  eight  male  insurants  are  credited  additional/credited 
remuneration  points,  and  the  share  of  such  remuneration  points  in  the  total  sum  of 
remuneration points for the eight insurants is quite low (ranging between 0.204 and 0.341 
percent). The regression coefficient for the “share of remuneration points from contribution-
free periods” exhibits a negative sign for all three samples. The effect of contribution-free 
periods on IRR is quantitatively stronger for females (at five percent level). Contribution-free 
periods include periods when no own contributions have been made for reasons not in the 
responsibility of the insurant (so-called “Ersatzzeiten”). Particularly, such periods include war 
captivity and prosecution during Nazi dictatorship. Contribution-free periods also encompass 
none-insured  periods  due  to  sickness,  maternity  or  unemployment  (so-called 
“Anrechungszeiten”).  IRR  decreases  in  the  “share  of  remuneration  points  from  such 
contribution-free  periods,”  and  the  effect  is  stronger  for  female  insurants.  The  “share  of 
remuneration  points  from  periods  of  reduced  contributions”  rises  IRR,  at  least  for  male 
insurants. For female insurants, the effect is insignificant. Periods of reduced contributions are 
a mixture of own-contribution periods and “Anrechnungszeiten”, for example, a month where 
an insurant is working part-time and simultaneously is enrolled as a student. If, during such 
                                                 
18 The expected life expectancy of the partner after the beneficiary’s death and the beneficiary’s life expectancy 
after retirement are highly correlated. The same applies to the difference between official retirement age and the 
beneficiary’s age at retirement. To avoid problems of multi-collinearity, we refrained from including the retiree’s 
life expectancy in the regression.   16 
periods,  remuneration  points  from  own  contributions  fall  below  a  specific  threshold, 
additional  remuneration  points  are  granted  (see  SSC  VI,  §  71,  para.  2).  The  effect  is 
particularly  strong  for  male  insurants.  The  “share  of  additional  remuneration  points  from 
periods of reduced contributions” also has a positive effect on IRR. Again, the effect is more 
pronounced for male compared to female insurants. 
Earnings capacity, measured by 
j RP   , turns out to be negatively related with IRR: the more 
contributions from own earnings an insurant has provided over her/his lifetime, the lower is 
IRR. Interpreting IRR as an indicator of the life-time redistribution, the finding indicates that 
Germany’s pension system is progressive, redistributing in favor of insurants with a lower 
earnings capacity. The effect is more pronounced for male compared to female insurants. We 
would like to remind the reader that the survival probabilities underlying our calculations do 
not differentiate with respect to income. Differential mortality may weaken or even offset the 
progressive effect.
19 
Via survivor pensions, the system also redistributes in favor of married insurants. Compared 
with  non-married  beneficiaries,  average  IRR  for  the  married  is  significantly  higher.  The 
longer life expectancy of females in combination with the positive age difference between 
husbands  and  spouses  explain  why  the  effect  is  more  pronounced  for  male  insurants 
(regression  coefficients  of  0.456  for  male  and  0.126  for  female  insurants,  and  a  highly 
significant 
2 χ  statistic). 
Early  retiring  beneficiaries  receive  below-average  returns  reflecting  regulations  punishing 
early retirement (for the role of early retirement on returns on pension contributions see also 
Börsch-Supan,  2000,  and  references  cited  therein).  As  indicated  by  an  insignificant
2 χ  
statistic, the impact of such regulations is the same for male and female insurants. 
Concerning the set of dummy variables distinguishing retirees by type of pension, full sample 
estimates indicate no differences in IRR for §35 retirees, our reference group, §36 and §237 
retirees. However, recipients of a old-age pensions for handicapped persons (SSC VI, §37) 
benefit from a slightly higher IRR, while the opposite is true for females receiving a §237a 
pension. The latter finding is driven by the fact that female §237a-pension recipients, on 
average, retire 2.893 years earlier than female insurants falling into another pension category. 
                                                 
19 Empirical evidence on the quantitative impact of income-differentiated mortality on the progressiveness of 
Social Security is mixed. For an overview see Liebman (2001).   17 
Finally, the regression constant is the same for female and male insurants. After controlling 
for all the right-hand side variables, regressions do not indicate IRR of male and female 
insurants to be different. 
 
6 Implications 
To get a better idea about what an average IRR of 3.3 percent means, it may be interesting to 
compare this number to the returns of a risk-free asset. We have chosen German Federal 
Treasury notes (with a seven-year life) as a benchmark. Between years 1969 and 2005, the 
average rate of return on such notes was 6.31 percent, although rates of return are lower from 
year 2000 and on. This can be seen from Figure 9 that provides time series of rates of return 
on seven-year life German Federal Treasury notes. Accordingly, in a world where insurants 
would have had an option to invest their PAYG contributions in bonds, they had been better-
off. 
Making such a direct comparison of returns is naive for a number of reasons. The PAYG 
system involves a life-insurance element. In particular, there are two issues concerning the 
timing of death. First, the capital stock from an investment in treasury notes may be exhausted 
too early in case the person lives longer than expected. On the contrary, the PAYG system 
covers the insurant until the random date of death. The second issue about the timing of death 
is that the insurant might die “too young”, even many years before retirement age. Then the 
PAYG system can serve, via survivor pensions, as insurance for the surviving partner (or 
children). Such a risk is not insured by an investment in treasury notes. Via pensions for the 
disabled, the PAYG system also provides insurance in case of reduced earning capacity. Risk-
averse  insurants  may  be  reluctant  to  accept  a  low  but  stable  rate  of  return  on  PAYG 
contributions rather than higher yet more volatile returns on bonds. Another aspect is that it is 
not ruled out that capital markets are affected by population ageing, too (with some delay). 
The asset market meltdown hypothesis predicts that, when the baby boomers retire, they will 
sell bonds and stocks and this will negatively affect the value of such assets (see Poterba, 
2001). Then returns on assets in the past are a too optimistic predictor for their future returns. 
Also, the recent turbulence in financial markets indicates that even conservative saving plans 
do not assure that saving wealth will be enough to pay for an adequate living standard during 
retirement. 
To better understand the meaning of our IRR estimates it is also interesting to examine the 
specific macro-economic conditions in the contribution phase of the 2005 retirees and the   18 
actual conditions when the entitlements must be financed by today’s contributors. For this 
reason, Figure 10 depicts the long-run trends of several macroeconomic variables since the 
early/mid 1950s. Our working sample  experienced  a long phase  with low unemployment 
rates, particularly in the 1950s until the early 1970s. Also labor productivity and wage growth 
have been quite high particularly in the earlier years, yet slowing down over the observation 
period. Particularly in the early years, a huge gap in gender-specific labor force participation 
rates existed, but the gap continuously narrowed. Low birth rates together with a rising life 
expectancy doubled the dependency ratio from about 16 percent in year 1950 to about 32 
percent in the late 2000. Compared to the later periods, inflation rates have been relatively 
high in the 1970s and in the early years after unification. 
Particularly the upward trend in the dependency ratio puts “stress” on the PAYG system. The 
higher the dependency ratio, the more retirees’ pension entitlements each actual contributor 
needs to finance. Ensuring a positive IRR for today’s elderly may result in higher contribution 
rates  for  today’s  active  generation  and/or  require  higher  tax-financed  transfers  thereby 
shedding doubts on the sustainability and economic attractiveness of the system for later 
generations.  Nevertheless,  only  recently  the  German  government  has  passed  a  law  that 
nominal pension entitlements of today’s pensioners will never decline, most likely resulting in 
higher contribution rates in the next years. Accordingly, our scenario with inter-temporally 
constant nominal pension entitlements may be a good benchmark for the actual IRR levels for 
the birth cohort 1940 to 1945. 
Low inflation rates and low nominal wage growth in recent years tend to lower average IRR. 
Given that inflation rates remain at a low level, future pensioner generations, ceteris paribus, 
are likely to realize lower nominal returns on their pension investments than the birth cohorts 
investigated in the present paper. If inflation rates systematically change over time, a fair 
profitability comparison, however, requires an IRR measurement in real terms. 
The decline in fertility together with the rise of female labor supply will have implications for 
the IRR distribution of future pensioner cohorts. Both trends are likely to reduce the length of 
non-contribution periods of female insurants, and this should translate into lower IRR for 
future  female  pensioner  cohorts.  Accordingly,  it  is  likely  that  the  gender  divide  in  IRR 
becomes lower in the next decades. Converging labor-force participation rates of females and 
males should work in the same direction.   19 
Finally, given the political will to guarantee a minimal living standard for pensioners together 
with  rising  unemployment  rates  and  discontinuous  employment  biographies,  more 
redistribution  will  be  required  in  the  future.  A  provision  of  the  funds  via  higher  PAYG 
contributions or lower returns, ceteris paribus, puts further pressure on the returns of insurants 
whose pension exceeds the legal minimum. An alternative financing via taxes results in a 
higher tax burden for particular economic groups or for the entire economy. If the sum of total 
earnings  is  negatively  affected  by  such  a  policy,  pension  cuts  and  lower  IRR  for  future 
cohorts are likely. 
 
7 Concluding remarks 
Based on real-life employment biographies for German PAYG pension insurants retiring in 
year 2005, the present paper has provided the distribution of intra-cohort internal rates of 
return  on  pension  contributions.  Such  information  should  be  particularly  useful  to  policy 
makers  who  want  to  understand  the  intra-cohort  redistributive  effects  of  Bismarck-type 
pension systems.  
Under the conservative assumption that nominal future pension entitlements are frozen at year 
2008 level, we find that the expected average nominal internal rate of return is slightly above 
three percent. Differences in life expectancy, earnings capacity, marital status and other socio-
economic  characteristics,  however,  translate  into  substantial  differences  in  IRR  across 
insurants. Our findings suggest that the German pension system, at least within the cohort 
retiring in 2005, redistributes towards female insurants (due to  a higher life expectancy), 
married insurants (due to survivor pensions), and towards insurants with children (as periods 
of child-care are credited in the German pension system). Moreover, it turns out that the 
system is intra-cohort progressive, as indicated by a negative correlation between rates of 
return and lifetime earnings-capacity. 
Finally,  some  words  on  the  limitations  of  our  analysis.  First,  our  IRR  estimates  are 
conditional upon reaching retirement age. Insurants deceasing earlier are not included in our 
calculations. The fraction of the population not reaching retirement age is about 15 percent for 
male and eight percent of female insurants. If no survivor pension is granted, the de-facto IRR 
of these insurants is minus infinity (positive investments but zero returns). Second, insurants 
with  East  German  employment  biographies  are  not  included  in  our  working  sample. 
Germany’s pension system, however, grants pension entitlements to people with East German 
employment biographies. As we see no sensible way to convert Mark, the currency in the   20 
former GDR to Euro, we have excluded these insurants from the analysis. Third, the working 
sample exclusively consists of old-age pensioners. Accordingly, our estimates do not reflect 
that the system redistributes resources to recipients of a pension of limited duration paid 
during a period of a serious illness. The inclusion of such benefits may affect both level and 
patterns of intra-cohort redistribution. Finally, the IRR estimates do not reflect that billions of 
taxes are spent to stabilize the system year by year, and that pensioners bear part of the tax 
burden.  In  year  1990,  taxes  in  the  amount  of  €  20.371  Billion  have  been  transferred  to 
stabilize the system. Until 2008, the amount has more than tripled to € 78.615 Billion (see 
German Pension Insurance, 2009, p. 221). 
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Figure 2. Joint survival probabilities by age cohort.
Note. From left to right and top to bottom: insurants retiring at age 60, 61, 62, 63, 64, and 65. Data from 
German Federal Statistical Office (2007).Figure 4. Retirement age, decomposed by gender.
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Figure 3. Share of tax financed expenditures of the German PAYG system.




































1990 1995 2000 2005 2010
yearFigure 5. Remuneration points, decomposed by gender. 
Note. Database is CIB 2005. Own calculations. Female beneficiaries: black bars; male beneficiaries: grey 
bars.
Figure 6. Length of contribution period by gender.
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remuneration pointsFigure 7. Rate of returns, decomposed by gender.
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IRRFigure 8. Rates of return, decomposed by type of pension and gender of insurants. 
Note. Database is CIB 2005. Own calculations. Left column from top to bottom: old age pension according to § 35 
SGB VI, § 36 SGB VI, § 37 SGB VI. Right column from top to bottom: old age pension according to § 237 SGB 
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Figure 9. Rates of return on seven-year life German Federal Treasury notes.












































































1960 1970 1980 1990 2000 2010
year
Figure 10. The macro picture.
Note. Figures before unification relate to the Federal Republic of Germany. Figures after unification relate to unified 
Germany. Left panel from top to bottom: (a) unemployment rate; data from German Federal Statistical Office (2009); (b) 
labor productivity growth rate per employee; data from German Federal Statistical Office (2009); (c) inflation rates; data 
from DIA (2010). Right panel from top to bottom: (a) labor force participation rates (black: female; grey: male); data from 
German Federal Statistical Office (2009); (b) changes in nominal wages; data from German Federal Statistical Office 














































































1960 1970 1980 1990 2000 2010
yearTable 1. Socio-demographics of the sample 
  Full sample  Male  Female 
Number of beneficiaries  21,509  10,209  11,300 
Number of non-married or widowed 
beneficiaries  4,835  1,858  2,977 
Number of (re)married beneficiaries  16,674  8,351  8,323 










Table 2. Number of beneficiaries by type of pension 
  LEAT   Full sample  Male  Female 
Old age retirement pension (SSC VI § 35)  16  9,575  3,478  6,097 
Old age pension long-term insured persons 
(SSC VI § 36)  63  2,161  1,888  273 
Old age pension handicapped persons (SSC VI 
§ 37)  62  2,151  1,462  689 
Old age pension in case of early 
retirement/unemployment (SSC VI § 237)   17  3,652  3,381  271 
Specific old age pension, female (SSC VI § 
237a)  18  3,970  ---  3,970 
Note. Column ‘LEAT’ gives the value of the variable LEAT which defines the corresponding type of 
pension. SSC VI denotes Social Security Code Book VI. Database is CIB 2005. 
 
 
Table 3. Composition of remuneration points 
Percentage of remuneration points from  Full sample  Male  Female 
84.711  92.486  77.686 
Contribution periods 
(12.705)  (5.538)  (13.068) 
15.289  7.514  22.314 
Non-contribution periods 
(12.605)  (5.538)  (13.068) 
Non-contribution periods in detail       
1.730  1.350  2.073 
Contribution free periods 
(2.553)  (2.378)  (2.656) 
5.175  3.916  6.312 
Reduced contribution periods 
(5.177)  (4.731)  (5.298) 
1.789  2.123  1.258 
Reduced contribution periods (additional) 
(1.933)  (1.576)  (1.975) 
6.588  0.128  12.429 
Child care and care  (10.125)  (5.254)  (10.981) 
0.007  0.001  0.013 
Additional/credited Child care and care  
(0.148)  (0.053)  (0.198) 
Note. Standard deviation in parentheses. SSC VI denotes Social Security Code Book 
VI. Database is CIB 2005. 
 
 Table 4. Rates of return by type of pension 
  Full sample  Male insurants  Female insurants 
3.261  2.572  3.884 
All considered types of pensions 
(1.636)  (0.839)  (1.910) 
4.177  3.167  4.753  Standard old age retirement pension 
(SSC VI § 35)  (1.896)  (0.967)  (2.048) 
2.485  2.293  3.816  Old age pension long-term insured 
persons (SSC VI § 36)  (0.854)  (0.510)  (1.393) 
2.636  2.494  2.936  Old age pension handicapped persons 
(SSC VI § 37)  (0.715)  (0.498)  (0.968) 
2.180  2.149  2.571  Old age pension in case of early 
retirement/unemployment  
(SSC VI § 237)   (0.588)  (0.544)  (0.900) 
2.807  ---  2.807  Specific old age pension, female (SSC VI 
§ 237a)  (1.000)  ---  (1.000) 
Note. Standard deviation in parentheses. SSC VI denotes Social Security Code Book VI. Database is CIB 2005. 
 Table 5. Results from regression analysis 
 
 
  Full sample  Male insurants  Female insurants 
Gender 
comparison 
Variable  Coef.  t stat.  Coef.  t stat.  Coef.  t stat. 
Chi-square 
test 
-2.353  -1.256  -2.860  Share of remuneration points from 










1.483  4.557  0.047  Share of remuneration points from 









2.177  4.372  2.426  Share of additional remuneration 
points from periods of reduced 










8.668  7.360  9.927  Share of remuneration points for 










-6.514  -63.671  -3.809  Share of additional/credited 
remuneration points for childcare 




















0.260  0.456  0.126 











-0.109  -0.088  -0.098  Difference between official 
retirement age and own age at time 








***  0.80 
-0.018  -0.066  0.101 









0.243  0.224  0.078 










-0.006  -0.074  -0.300 










-0.288  ---  -0.215 








**  --- 










***  1.59 
F statistic  2,813.02    1,724.58    1,077.83     
Adjusted R-squared  0.611    0.650    0.533     
Note. Three stars denote significance at the 1 percent level; two stars at the five percent level; one star at the ten percent level. Standard 
errors in parentheses. SSC VI denotes Social Security Code Book VI. Database is CIB 2005. 
 